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Abstract 
 
With tourism, the existence of country-specific commodities that have to be bought and 
consumed locally plays an essential role. The paper is about how optimal taxation rules 
are modified when the taxable goods include goods demanded by tourists. The main point 
is that tax rates can be manipulated to shift some of the tax burden from domestic 
residents onto tourists. There is indeed a reason why an optimum taxation approach is 
useful for tourism, as the goods are consumed inside the host country, and discrimination 
is difficult. 
 
The paper combines several scenarios where tourism may be relevant for optimal tax 
policy. It begins by considering the determinants of tourist demand. Then, the well-known 
optimal commodity tax rules are modified to include the effect of foreign demand. Tourists 
are assumed to trade at the same prices as domestic consumers, but to have zero welfare 
weight. Thus, the government must balance the desire to tax tourists with the deadweight 
loss suffered by its own residents. The government should raise some taxes, when tourism 
begins. Tourism-oriented goods with low price elasticities should bear the highest taxes. 
However, tourism-related pollution cannot be taxed at prohibitive rates or tourist revenue 
would be lost altogether. Possible extensions are introduced, for example competition 
among destination countries. Should tourism dependent countries that are geographical 
neighbours and substitutes have closely linked tax systems? What kind of tax policy is 
best when the tourist destinations serve as complements to each other? 
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1. Introduction 
 
Tourism1 today is not only a vital source of foreign currency, but it is one of the 
fastest growing industries in many parts of the world. Travel is placed rather high in 
the consumers’ scale of preferences.  The tourist explosion cannot be regarded as a 
passing phenomenon. The growth of incomes, the reduction in working hours and the 
saturation of other forms of consumer spending will cause the trend to continue. 
 
Government policy can play an important role in tourism. First, the government may 
encourage tourism by advertising tourist attractions abroad. Second, by adopting an 
appropriate pricing policy it may ensure that the economy achieves the full benefits 
from tourism. Tax revenue is likely to be the major source of benefits. It provides a 
method of extracting rents from tourists for the services of the unpriced natural 
amenities that they consume. 
 
Despite the positive impacts tourism can present a threat to the environment. 
Environmental impacts grow in line with increases in the number of tourists. Natural 
and built environments can be damaged by excessive flows of tourists. Congested 
museums, polluted beaches and eroded landscapes can be problems in tourism 
areas. A balance between tourism and the environment should be maintained. 
 
The literature on tourism has had its focal point in modelling tourist demand. The 
framework of consumer demand theory has been used in econometric studies to 
examine how demand for tourist services or tourist destination areas will react to 
changes in the main determinants of demand, such as income levels and relative 
prices.2 Other issues remain scarce. Copeland (1991), however, has examined the 
effects of an increase in tourism on welfare, output and factor prices in the host 
country using a general equilibrium international trade model. He shows that in the 
absence of taxes, foreign ownership and distortions, an increase in foreign visitors 
will increase welfare only if the price of non-tradeables3 increases. Commodity taxes 
tend to increase the gains from tourism, while factor mobility and foreign ownership 
tend to reduce them. Diamond (1969) has written a paper on tourism, dealing with 
optimal pricing. 
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This paper investigates the effects of international tourism on optimal commodity 
taxes. There is indeed a reason why an optimum taxation approach is useful for 
tourism, as the goods are consumed inside the host country, and discrimination is 
difficult. The investigation starts by considering tourist demand for goods and the 
motivation to travel. In the third section the well-known commodity tax rules will be 
modified to include the effect of foreign demand.4 An extended version of the problem 
is considered, where the number of tourists, previously taken exogenous, is a 
function of a typical tourist’s utility level. In section 4 externalities such as congestion 
and other costs due to tourism are discussed. The model is amended to allow for an 
externality associated with the consumption of one of the goods purchased by 
tourists. In section 5 possible extensions are introduced. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Tourist Demand 
 
The fundamental motivation for tourist travel is a need, real or perceived, for a break 
from routine that can best be achieved by a physical change of place. People travel 
for pleasure. Tourism is about consuming goods and services which are in some 
sense unnecessary. They are consumed because they supposedly generate 
pleasurable experiences which are different from those typically encountered in 
everyday life. 
 
A basic distinction between tourism and other forms of leisure is the travel 
component. To be able to satisfy his desire to travel, the tourist must be able to afford 
both the time and the money. Tourism in turn gives rise to various service demands.  
It should be noted that almost all the services provided to tourists have to be 
delivered at the time and place in which they are produced. Tourist products cannot 
be stored. 
 
Tourism-oriented products include such as accommodation, restaurants, 
transportation and entertainment. As tourists extend their stay at destination sites, 
they may increase the use of resident-oriented products, such as hospitals, 
bookstores, or barber shops. However, their main reason for travelling is to enjoy the 
background tourism elements: natural, sociocultural and manmade attractions. Some 
background tourism elements are often free goods, for example sunshine. 
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Tourist demand for goods is similar to the demand for most other products and 
services. The basic determinants are prices, disposable incomes, tastes, habits and 
preferences. 
 
A considerable number of studies of the determinants of tourist demand have been 
published.5 There are wide variations in the values of estimated elasticities. However, 
most of the significant price elasticities were below one, and demand turned out to be 
highly responsive to income changes. The high income elasticity of demand for 
tourist services will classify tourism as a luxury. As incomes increase the proportion 
spent on necessities lessens, leaving more money available for discretionary 
spending. This income will be spent on leisure, recreation and travel.6
 
3. Optimal Commodity Taxes and Tourism 
 
Most countries use commodity taxes and subsidies to raise revenues or to meet 
social objectives. When a country is visited by tourists, the main question that arises 
in this context is: How tax rates should be manipulated to shift some of the tax 
burden from domestic residents onto tourists? Unless rebates to visitors are feasible, 
tourists will trade at the same prices as resident consumers. When the government 
collects an exogenously determined sum in taxes, the welfare of the inhabitants in 
the country could be raised by more the greater the part tourists pay of it. But we 
have to keep in mind that taxes, which are assumed to be the same for all 
consumers, also affect home welfare. 
 
3.1. The Economy 
 
Let us consider the simplest economy imaginable. Suppose that the consumer side 
of the economy can be treated as if there were only one consumer. Tourists are 
regarded as an important trading opportunity for the country, and the aim is to 
maximize the welfare of domestic consumers only. Price discrimination between 
tourists and residents is not allowed: both visitors and domestic consumers will face 
the same prices. 
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Let us assume that there are  commodities in the economy. Labour is denoted 
commodity  and the remaining  commodities are consumer goods. Suppose now 
that the government wants some resources for its own use, and collects the sum 
1+m
0 m
T  
with commodity taxes. Producer prices are assumed to be given, and labour is 
chosen as untaxed numeraire. Letting  be the tax on commodity i ,  is defined as 
the difference between the price paid by the consumer 
it it
( )iq  and that which is 
received by the producer ( ) : ip iii pqt −= . 
 
Since the economy is assumed to behave like a consumer the natural objective of 
the government is to maximize the welfare of the representative individual: 
 
(1) . ( )mhhh xxxUU ,...,, 10=
 
This function is assumed to satisfy the usual differentiability and concavity 
requirements with the following sign assumption for the first-order partial derivatives: 
 and . ( )miUi ,...,2,10 => 00 <U
 
The representative consumer supplies  units of labour and consumes  of good 
 . He is assumed to maximize U  subject to the budget constraint: 
hx0 ihx
i ( mi ,...,2,1= )
 
(2) . ∑
=
=m
i
ihi xq
0
0
 
Let  be the demand by tourists for commodity  of the economy. Then the fixed 
revenue constraint of the public sector can be written as : 
ifx i
 
(3) . ( )∑
=
=+m
i
ifihi Txxt
1
 
We have agreed that the basic determinants of tourist demand are prices and 
different attractions such as climate. Thus, if we can assume that those domestic 
amenities do not change, we can write tourist demand as depending on prices only. 
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3.2. Optimal Tax Structure 
 
The government aims to maximize individual welfare subject to the revenue 
constraint (3) and the individual conditions for utility maximization.7 Following 
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971), the problem may conveniently be treated in terms of the 
indirect utility function. 
 
Forming the Lagrangean 
 
(4)  ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −++= ∑=
m
i
ifihimhhoh TxxtxxxUL
1
1 ,...,, λ
 
gives the first order conditions for the tax rate : kt
 
(5) 0
0 1
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂⋅∂
∂∑ ∑
= =
m
i
m
i
kfkh
k
if
k
ih
i
k
ih
ih
xx
q
x
q
xt
q
x
x
U λ  
       ( )mk ,...,2,1= . 
 
Writing α  for the marginal utility of income to the consumer, the consumer’s utility 
maximization implies that i
ih
q
x
U α=∂
∂ . Further, from the budget constraint of the 
consumer we get: 
∑
=
=+∂
∂⋅m
i
kh
k
ih
i xq
xq
0
0 . Thus, the condition (5) can be written as  
 
(6) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂+∂
∂= ∑
=
m
i
kfkh
k
if
k
ih
ikh xxq
x
q
xtx
1
λα  
      ( )mk ,...,2,1= , 
 
where khxα−  is the direct impact on social welfare from having a higher consumer 
price. The expression in the brackets tells us how the tax revenue changes when the 
tax of commodity  is raised.k 8 The equation states that the impact of a tax 
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increase on social welfare is proportional to the induced change in tax revenue 
(at fixed producer prices).9 In general it is not possible to solve explicitly for the 
optimal taxes, since the quantities demanded depend on the taxes. 
 
Let us now denote the aggregate consumption of commodity  by , so that 
. Then it is possible to rewrite (6) in the form 
k kX
kfkhk xxX +=
 
(7) 
( )
kh
k
ii
x
t
Xt
∂
∂
=
∑
λ
α
   ( )mk ,...,2,1= . 
 
The formula states that for all commodities the ratio of marginal tax revenue 
from an increase in the tax on that commodity to the quantity of that 
commodity consumed by the domestic consumer is constant. Thus if we adopt 
a tax-reform perspective it is directly obvious that if  
 
j
j
i
i
t
Welfare
t
venue
t
Welfare
t
venue
∂
∂
∂
∂
−>
∂
∂
∂
∂
−
ReRe
 , 
it  should rise relative to  (at constant revenue). If the reverse holds, then  should 
fall relative to  (at constant revenue). 
jt it
jt
 
To obtain detailed results on the optimal tax structure, we need to make more 
specific assumptions. There are some special cases that can give some intuitive 
insight. 
 
First, let us consider the special case that all cross derivatives of the demand 
functions vanish as between the taxed goods.10 Condition (6) may then be rewritten 
as  
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(8) 
kk
k
kh
k
k
k E
X
x
q
t
⋅−
== λ
α
φ
1
 , where 
k
k
k
k
kk X
q
q
XE ⋅∂
∂−=   
       ( )mk ,...,2,1= . 
 
The idea behind this rule is to impose the highest tax rates on the commodities 
with the lowest price elasticities of aggregate demand. But the higher the share 
of domestic consumption of good  is the lower the tax rate on that 
commodity should be. Thus, if we have good 
k
j  purchased only by domestic 
consumers, condition (8) is simplified to the well-known inverse elasticity rule11
 
jjh
j ε
λ
α
φ
−
=
1
, 
 
where jjhε−  is the direct price elasticity of demand for the good. Recall that the factor 
λα /  is positive, and can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between 
private and public income. So, if the marginal value of private income  is higher 
than that of public income, commodity 
a
j  should be subsidized. In the case of 
 the optimal solution is the zero tax rate on good 1=a j . If, instead, the 
commodity l  is produced only for tourists, we should have 
 
llf
l εφ
1=  , 
 
where llfε−  is the price elasticity of tourist demand for the good. For such a good 
social welfare U  is independent of its price and the government should set the tax 
rate to maximize tax revenue from tourists. - Souvenirs are a good example. They 
are produced merely for tourists and they are goods whose prices hardly affect other 
types of demand. In summary, the results indicate that a simple tax structure 
(uniform sales or value-added taxes) is very seldom optimal.12
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Equations (5) were derived only for k m,...,2,1= . .  But they hold also for k Thus, it 
is possible to rewrite (7) as 
0=
 
( )
khk
m
i
iii
xq
Xpq
10 ⋅∂
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −∂
=
∑
=
λ
α
  ( )mk ,...,2,1,0= . 
 
The tourist side of the economy is treated as if there were only one tourist. Further, 
since the tourist does not work, the tourist expenditure in the country is assumed to 
be some constant.13
 
Using ordinary demand elasticities, 
 
ih
k
k
ih
ikh x
q
q
x ⋅∂
∂=ε  and 
if
k
k
if
ikf x
q
q
x ⋅∂
∂=ε  , 
 
we can now rewrite the optimal taxation formula in the form 
 
(9) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⋅= ∑ ∑
i i
ikfifiikhihikk
khk
xtxtXq
xq
εελ
α 1 . 
 
If we have a good whose price does not affect other types of demand, implying a 
unitary own-price elasticity ( 1−= )ε 14, equation (9) simplifies to yield the optimal tax 
on that good: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
kh
kf
k
k
x
x
p
q 1α
λ
  . ( )0≠khx
 
Thus, the more the consumption of good  is concentrated in the tourist sector, the 
higher taxes we have to impose on the good. For goods consumed in the same 
proportion by tourists and domestic households tax rates become equal. If 
tourists do not consume the commodity, the tax rate should be set according to 
k
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α
λ=
k
k
p
q
 , 
 
which is the well-known optimal tax result found in Diamond-Mirrlees (1971, p. 264). 
If the good  is consumed only by tourists, so that , but  is , the rule 
degenerates to: 
k 0→khx kfx 0>
∞→
k
k
p
q
. The same pricing rule will follow also from 
llf
llf εφ
1=  in the 
above, provided that the elasticity llfε−  takes the value 1− .15 For the commodity, the 
result indicates an extremely high consumer price as compared to the production 
costs. Either the production costs of that commodity are zero or the production costs 
 are insignificant. The result is equivalent to choosing the price level so that taxes 
paid by tourists by consuming the good are maximized. - The commodity is free in 
the sense that the production costs are of minor importance. For one reason or 
another the inhabitants of the country are not interested in consuming it. However, 
since tourists demand it and are willing to pay for it, a tax can collected.
kp
16 An 
example could be a tourist beach. According to the tax rule an entrance fee (= tax) 
for tourist beaches should be set.17
 
3.3. The Number of Tourists 
 
Tourist expenditure is likely to be of more interest for policy purposes than the 
number of visits, but fewer econometric studies have looked at this aspect. The most 
frequently used dependent variable is the total number of visits.18
 
A tourist maximizes his utility under budget constraints. The supernumerary income 
that remains after expenditure necessary to maintain the standard of living at home 
can be allocated among various products abroad. 
 
Thus far we have considered tourist demand as an aggregate. Let us now allow 
separately for the number of tourists and the demand of the typical tourist for different 
commodities. Write the tourist demand for good i  to be ifif xNx ~⋅= , where N  is the 
number of visitors and ifx~  the demand for good . Assume i N  to be a function of 
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typical tourist’s utility level: ( )fUNN ~= . Both U~ , and so also N , and ifx~  are 
functions of the price structure of the country. In fact, we are assuming that prices 
determine the tourist type as well as the number of them. 
 
The rule (7) can now be written as 
 
(10) 
( )
kh
i
ifi
ki
dNii
k
x
xt
t
NXt
t ∑∑ ∂
∂+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂
=
=
~
0
λ
α
   ( )mk ,...,2,1= . 
 
In expression (10) the marginal tax revenue associated with a marginal increase in 
the tax rate on the commodity are written in two separate components. The first 
component contains the effect for a given level of tourist visits while the latter 
contains the effect via the change in visitor numbers only. If the numbers remain 
constant, then increased expenditure implies increasing average expenditure per 
tourist, implying longer-staying and/or higher expenditure tourists. On the other hand, 
if the numbers increase faster than the increase in expenditure the exact opposite 
effect could be postulated. 
 
Let us consider goods that are produced only for tourists and especially a good l  
whose price does not affect other types of demand. Then the optimal tax rule 
llf
l εφ
1=  above, where llfε−  is the price elasticity of tourist demand of the good, can 
be rewritten in the form 
 
[ ] γεφ −== =0
1
dNllfl
l
l q
t
. 
 
Here the elasticity llfε−  is divided into two components: to “the price elasticity of 
tourists” 
N
q
q
N l
l∂
∂=γ , and the price elasticity of the good at constant number of visitors 
[ ]
0=− dNllfε . 
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In making their travel plans tourists may assess the price of just a certain good or 
service. Such goods and services are naturally important for domestic policies 
designed to attract foreign visitors.19 Through its pricing policy the country can 
affect not only the number of tourists’ visits, but the quality of visitors as well. 
Resorts that are fairly cheap places to visit cater for a mass of middle-class visitors, 
while wealthier holiday-makers go elsewhere looking for superior accommodation, 
scenery and social tone. Holiday-making is a form of conspicuous consumption. The 
attractiveness of a place depends on how many other people are staying there and 
especially how many other people there are like oneself. Most countries are 
nowadays opponents of high-volume, large-scale, enclavic forms of tourist 
development. Mass tourism has been seen to fail to deliver economic benefits while 
causing severe social disruption. High price level country will attract wealthier tourists 
if it attracts tourists at all. 
 
3.4. An Example 
 
In order to illustrate our theoretical results let us consider a three good economy with 
fixed producer prices. Assume that the consumer has Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
 
( ) ( ) 0,0,0,log1loglog 3213212211 ≤≤−≥≥+−−++= hhhhhh xAxxxAaaxaxaU . 
 
Take first the case without foreign demand. With good 3 as untaxed numeraire the 
optimal tax structure to finance government expenditures at size T  becomes: 
 
Ap
p
q
i
i
3λα
λ ==   , ( )2,1=i
 
i.e. a uniform tax rate is preferable.20
 
The proposition above treats all consumer as identical, whereas tourists have a zero 
welfare weight. It would be counterintuitive if we did not want to  raise some taxes 
when tourism begins. 
 12
When tourist demand is introduced the optimal price structure of the economy is the 
following: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−
=
∑
i
ifi
kk
k
k
xt
qa
Ap
p
q
λ
λ
1
3   ( )2,1=k . 
 
The marginal tax revenue paid by tourists associated with a marginal increase in the 
tax on the commodity, i.e. 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂ ∑
i
ifi
k
xt
q
   ( )2,1=k , 
 
can be positive, negative or zero. If it happens to be zero, for instance with , the 
optimal price 
1=k
Apq 31 λ=  will be lower than the corresponding price ( Ap3λ= ) before 
tourism.21 The greater the value of this term is, the higher the tax that can be set on 
the commodity concerned. This gives the rule to tax more heavily the commodity 
with high tax export character. Raising the price , which means higher taxes, 
normally makes the demand  lower, which lowers the sum of taxes received. But 
raising  may induce tourists to substitute  to , which at the same time may 
produce a higher tax sum. 
kq
kx
kq kx lx
 
Note that uniform taxation may still be optimal when tourism begins. The rate can, 
of course, be different. This is true, if 
 
2
1
2
1
a
a
xt
q
xt
q
i
ifi
i
ifi
=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂
∑
∑
. 
 
Now from the FOC’s for the consumer’s utility maximization we know that 
 
 13
h
h
xq
xq
a
a
22
11
2
1 = . 
 
Thus, if the change in taxes paid by tourists due to a change in  divided by that due 
to a change in  is equal to the ratio of the expenditure shares of those goods for 
resident citizens, uniform taxation is preferable. 
1q
2q
 
Further, the tourist budget may be fixed. In that case the optimal tax rates can be 
expressed as 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=
kh
kf
k
k
x
x
Ap
p
q 13λ ,      where ( ) ( )2,1/3 == kqApax kkkh . 
 
A uniform tax rate is now preferable provided that 
2
1
22
11
a
a
xq
xq
f
f = , i.e. if the expenditure 
shares of the commodities in the tourist budget equal the expenditure shares of those 
goods for domestic consumer.22
 
4. Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities 
 
Tourism is often based on a country’s natural attractions, and the quality of these 
attractions plays a very important role in tourist demand. Quality in turn depends on 
the exploitation of the resource. As a consequence, there is a negative relationship 
between quality and the tourist population. Consider, for example, a natural attraction 
such as a beach. The higher the number of tourists allowed to stay there, the lower 
the per-capita availability of the resource is and the lower the quality of the good. 
 
Preferences are such that more of the natural resource is preferred to less. 
Consumers are adverse to crowding, and human congestion has a significantly 
negative impact on the users’ willingness to pay for those services. However, in the 
absence of public restrictions most resorts are likely to become overcrowded, since 
individual tourists may ignore their own contribution to the depletion of the natural 
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resource. There may come a point when more people use the area than can be 
supported by it. The result is a spoiling of the environment. 
 
When externalities are present, Pigovian taxes can be used to correct the 
inefficiencies. But the government may need other, distortionary taxes in order to 
satisfy its revenue requirements. Sandmo (1975) has shown that the Pigovian 
principle holds in a modified form in a second-best situation. 
 
Let us now consider the theoretical problem of determining optimal taxes when a 
negative externality is present and the country is visited by tourists. Let good  be 
the externality creating good. The externality is assumed to be a function of the total 
consumption of that good. Now the utility function of the representative consumer can 
be written as 
m
 
(11) , ( )110 ,,...,, += mmhhh xxxxuu
 
where  with ( mmfmhm Xxxx =+=+1 ) 01 <+mu  represents the effect of the atmospheric 
externality.23
 
The individual is assumed not to take account of his own contribution to congestion, 
so that the first order condition corresponding (6) is 
 
(12) 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
+∂⋅∂
∂= ∑
=+
kfkh
k
if
k
ih
m
i
i
k
mfmh
m
kh xxq
x
q
xt
q
xx
x
ux
11
λα   
        ( )mk ,...,2,1= . 
 
The way in which the externality affects the optimal price structure is seen clearly in 
the special case where there are no cross price effects. In that case condition (12) 
gives the same conditions as before for goods 1,...,1 −m . In contrast, with the good 
generating the external effect, there is a further term. For example, instead of rule (8) 
commodity  should now be taxed according to the following rule: m
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(13) 
m
m
mm
m
mh
m
m
m u
u
E
X
x
q
t 1
1
+⋅−
⋅−
== λ
αλ
α
φ  ,  where 
m
m
m
m
mm X
q
q
XE ⋅∂
∂−= . 
 
When there is no foreign demand, equation (13) reduces to 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−+⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⋅−
−
= ++
m
m
mmhm
m
mmhm
m
u
u
u
u
q
t 11 11
1
λ
α
ελ
α
λ
α
ε
λ
α
, 
 
i.e. the optimal tax rate for the externality creating good is a weighted average 
of the inverse elasticity and the marginal social damage. This is the statement of 
the result by Sandmo (1975); the statement that holds true also without the 
assumption of independent demands. 
 
Rule (13) is an extension of Sandmo’s result to cover the demand of visiting tourists 
as well. Here the optimal tax on the externality-creating commodity is not a 
weighted average of the two terms, but the additivity property holds: the 
marginal social damage of commodity  enters the tax formula for that 
commodity additively. 
m
 
Let us consider goods purchased only by tourists. If the commodity does not involve 
a negative externality, social welfare is independent of its price, and the government 
should set the tax rate to maximize tax revenue from tourists. However, if the 
commodity purchased only by tourists is externality-generating24, marginal 
social damage should be reflected in the tax on the good. Setting the tax rate to 
maximize tax revenue from tourists is not optimal in this case. For such a good     
 
m
m
mmfm
m
mmfm
m
v
u
q
u
q
t 11 11 ++ ⋅−=−= λ
β
ελε  , 
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where β
m
m
vq =  follows from the tourist’s utility maximization under the budget 
constraint;  denoting the tourist’s utility function and v β  the marginal utility of the 
tourist’s budget. 
 
In the Sandmo’s case, marginal rate of substitution between private and public 
income ( )λα /=  equal to 1  implied the first best solution with a tax on good  only. 
When the foreign demand is present as in our case, the first best would require 
m
λα /  
to be equal to , which is a very demanding condition. 
However, if the externality-generating commodity is purchased only by tourists, 
the Pigovian tax alone does never satisfy the tax requirements exactly. 
Additional taxes will be called for. 
( miixX ihi ,...,2,1/ = )∀
 
This is the standard “fishing-in-a-lake” story, but things become a bit more 
complicated depending upon who the “fishers” are (h  or ), who they hurt, and 
whose utility is taken into account for setting taxes. Social damage should be 
reflected in the tax on the good, but tourism-caused pollution cannot be taxed at 
prohibitive rates (or simply prohibited, as a taxable good is probably an excludable 
good, too) or tourist revenue would be lost altogether. 
f
 
5. Possible Extensions 
 
(1) More structure on the decision problem of tourists. There may be more mileage to 
be gained by imposing rather more structure on the decision problem of tourists. A 
tax instrument missing from the analysis can be introduced: the departure tax (or 
entry fee). The ability to deploy such a tax might perhaps affect the optimal tax rules. 
For example, one could presumably raise the same revenue from each tourist and 
make them better off (so attracting more of them) by exempting them from 
commodity taxes but charging them an equal-yield entry-fee. Furthermore, tourists 
are effectively constrained to take large amounts of leisure during their visit. 
Consequently, the presence of tourists presumably strengthens the conventional 
Ramsey-type presumption that complements with leisure should be taxed especially 
heavily. Moreover, and perhaps more subtly, since tourists have no earned income in 
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the country visited, a uniform commodity tax will cease to be equivalent to a wage 
tax. This suggests that not only the structure of commodity tax rates but also their 
level will be affected by tourism. One might expect the balance between direct and 
indirect taxes to be shifted by tourism towards indirect taxation. 
 
(2) Externalities. Regarding externalities, there seems to be two potential problems. 
One is that increased tourist congestion harms domestic consumers, and the other is 
that excessive tourist use makes the area unattractive to other tourists. We 
considered the case, where demand depends only on prices. When demand also 
depends on congestion, the optimal price structure is different. Consumers may even 
be price insensitive and congestion sensitive in their demands. If the destination is 
allowed to deteriorate, tourists may well be turned away, for the very thing that 
attracted them in the first place is no longer attractive. It could be interesting to 
combine the section on endogenous number of tourists with a congestion externality 
using the well-known formulation of the consumption benefits of a good (  as 
, . Thus for , 
)x
aNxx /ˆ = 10 << a 0=a xx =ˆ  (no congestion), while for ,  
(full congestion). 
1=a Nxx /ˆ =
 
(3) Tax Competition. The tourist sector is entering an age of more competition among 
destination regions and countries. Moreover, consumers are both more 
knowledgeable about tourist destinations and travel options, and more demanding 
regarding the travel and tourist products and services chosen. 
 
The competing countries25 share many common characteristics specific to the group, 
such as natural and climatic conditions, otherwise they would not be substitutes. 
They compete for the same tourists as, for example, Greece and Turkey for North 
European tourists. Differences in the price structures attract tourist demand from one 
country to the other. Changes in the price of the holiday will be transmitted to the 
tourist as the reputation for expensiveness or cheapness of the country. 
 
But countries need not be substitutes. They may specialize in alternative types of 
tourists, or the countries may be complements. For example, from an American 
perspective visits to Latin America and to Europe attract separate tourist groups, 
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while visits to Europe by Americans generally include trips to several European 
countries.26
 
(4) Expenditure Side. A problem in government policy toward tourism is related to the 
expenditure side. First, the government may encourage tourism by advertising tourist 
attractions abroad. Second, in some countries additional money has to be spent in 
order to protect tourists. Third, an important aspect in a person’s decision to visit a 
country concerns also the infrastructure. A country may have beautiful amenities, but 
it attracts few tourists if it is not easily accessible from other countries and/or 
transportation within the country is difficult. Consequently, the government faces 
various significant tradeoffs. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Tourism represents a special category of demand. It is a demand for a bundle of 
goods and services. Furthermore, tourist goods and services are not transported to 
their users, but rather the consumers are transported to the goods and services. 
Tourist demand functions may look quite different than the demands for the same 
commodities by domestic residents. 
 
Time is a very important factor in tourism. A person determines how much time and 
money should be allotted to the holiday. Different people in different circumstances 
look for different ways to spend their holidays. Natural, sociocultural and manmade 
attractions are the elements that constitute the main reasons for travel. Prices would 
be expected to be the most important along with special factors of a noneconomic 
nature which potential tourists would encounter at the tourist destinations. 
 
Tourism is an economic activity that provides the countries receiving tourists with a 
dependable source of income and foreign currency. The magnitude of the economic 
benefit depends on price strategies. Tax revenue is likely to be the major source of 
benefits from tourism. Economists have long recognized that the ability to export 
taxes to out-of-state taxpayers should affect the choice of tax instruments. 
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This paper has analysed optimal tax policy in the presence of tourism with a very 
simple model. Tourists were assumed to trade at the same prices as resident 
consumers, but to have a zero welfare weight. Taxes assumed to be the same for all 
consumers also affect home welfare. Thus we cannot charge tax rates that will only 
maximize tax revenue from tourists. The home country government must balance the 
desire to tax tourists with the deadweight loss suffered by its own residents. 
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Notes 
 
1 A variety of definitions for tourism exist. Mill (1990, p. 17) gives the definition of tourism as: ”Tourism is not 
an industry, although tourism gives rise to a variety of industries. Tourism is an activity engaged in by people 
that travel.” Pearce (1981, p. 1) defines tourism as temporary stays of people travelling primarily for leisure or 
recreational purposes. 
2  Johnson -Ashworth (1990) 
3 Goods and services, such as restaurant meals, that are normally non-tradeable, become partially tradeable when 
the country is visited by tourists. 
4  This section is based on Hämäläinen (1982, pp.76-95). 
5  See Johnson - Ashworth (1990). 
6  Once consumers have made the choice of how much income will be allocated to travel demand, they have to 
decide which tourist destination will be visited. Competitive relationships often exist among destinations vying 
for the same tourist markets. There is evidence that some tourist destinations serve as substitutes, whereas others 
are complementary. According to Eadington-Redman (1991) destination sites may be classified as luxury, 
normal or inferior. 
7 In fact, this can be seen as a special case of the many-household optimal commodity tax problem (Atkinson-
Stiglitz 1980, pp. 386-388) when only two households exist and the second has a zero welfare weight in the 
government’s utility function. 
8  Since λ−  is negative (as the marginal social value of an increase in T ), no account being taken of the uses 
of T , it follows that λ  is . 0>
1
9  The statement holds true whether there are tourists visiting the country or not. See Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) 
pp. 261-262. 
10  A more reasonable assumption would be that commodities fall into groups so that goods are more or less 
independent between the groups, but dependent within the group. 
11  Equivalent to rule (13) in Sandmo (1976), p. 45. 
12  This particular model does not consider practical concerns that tend to favour simple systems, things like 
implementation costs, compliance costs, transparency, etc., which appear to influence actual government policy-
making. For instance, in European countries there has been a move towards uniformity of tax rates with the 
introduction of value added tax. ( - At the same time differential rates have been maintained in most countries.) 
13  This is a natural assumption, since when making their travel plans, tourists have to make the choice how 
much income will be allocated to the vacation package as a whole. Even though the tourist budget is assumed to 
be fixed, there still remains the question of how the sum is to be allocated between different goods. 
- In reality, currency restrictions are imposed on people travelling abroad and limits are imposed on foreign 
tourists concerning the importation or exportation of the currency of the country visited. (Applicable only to a 
fraction of world vacation travel spending.) 
14  Cournot aggregation condition. 
15  This is also the pricing rule of a monopolist operating at zero cost if =ε . 
16 Goods produced at zero marginal cost should be free if there is no rivalry (no congestion) in use and if  fixed 
costs can be covered by a lump sum tax. Otherwise they should be charged according to the Boiteux-Ramsey 
rule (Atkinson-Stiglitz, 1980), provided  excludability can be organized. 
17  In general, the entry fees of tourists help governments to maintain scenic and historic heritage; monuments, 
buildings and parks. 
18  Johnson-Ashworth (1990), pp. 145-6. 
19  The findings of Pyo-Uysal-McLellan (1991) suggest that among the tourist-oriented products, transportation 
is the most price sensitive product. Expenditures on food consumption away from home cannot be reduced very 
much. Thus transportation cost reduction can be persuasive and attractive. The income elasticity of 
transportation turned out to be greater than one, suggesting that transportation is a luxury product, whereas 
demand for food services was inelastic. Other income elasticities of demand were almost unitary. The 
uncompensated price elasticities of the study were -0.580 and -0.250 for transportation and food service. Cross 
price elasticities were very small, except in the transportation equation. - If the price of any good increases, 
people tend to decrease spending on transportation most. In the uncompensated price elasticity context, the 
resident-oriented products were more price elastic than the tourism-oriented products suggesting that many 
higher income tourists would travel even though there were a price increase. All uncompensated cross-price 
elasticities had negative signs. 
20  The Cobb-Douglas preferences implies separability between commodity consumption and leisure. It is well 
known that uniform taxation is optimal in this case. See, e.g. Myles (1995), pp. 125-7. 
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21  The marginal social value of an increase in T  is smaller with tourist demand, i.e. λλ > . 
22  C.f. Myles (1995), pp. 112-3. 
23  The treatment of the externality is rather stylized, but it will capture essential aspects of environmental 
externalities (traffic congestion, air and water pollution resulting from the production of certain commodities, 
etc.) The externality is technological rather than congestion-based. 
24  An example could be the noise of a tourist beach. 
25  On tax competition, see Mintz-Tulkens (1986), Crombrugghe-Tulkens (1990) and Kanbur-Keen (1993).  
26  Syriopoulos-Sinclair (1993) found out that individual countries within the Mediterranean group may be 
substitutes or  complements. According to Syriopoulus-Sinclair (1993) the elasticities of expenditure 
demonstrated considerable differences in tourist demand preferences between origin countries, and between 
traditional and newly developing destinations. The own and cross-price elasticities indicated the importance of 
effective prices. Although tourism plays a major role in the economies of all the destinations considered, the 
elasticity values indicate that the effects of an increase in tourist expenditure differ notably between destinations. 
Turkey, followed by Portugal and Greece, appeared to be the most tourist expenditure elastic destinations, while 
Spain and Italy seemed to benefit only marginally from increases in total tourist expenditure by the origin 
countries. Tourists’ reactions to effective price changes varied considerably, both by origin countries, for a given 
destination, and by destination, for a given origin. The estimated cross-price elasticities also varied considerably, 
and indicated a range of substitutability and complementarity among destinations. Tourists originating from 
Sweden, followed by the UK and Germany, seem to pay considerable attention to effective prices, and real price 
changes in the destinations considered would have a major impact on tourist flows from these countries. 
Effective prices were an  important determinant of the demand for tourism in the Mediterranean. Whereas the 
Mediterranean destinations considered might be expected to be substitutes for each other, given the similar 
tourism characteristics, complementarity would not be unrealistic, as tourists may include more than one 
destination in their holiday decisions. Spain and Portugal turned out to be substitutes, Greece and Italy 
complements. 
